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Abstract 
When speakers describe the world, they typically do so from their own perspective. However, 
they are able to adopt a different perspective, and sometimes do so even when they are not 
communicating with someone who has a different perspective from their own.  In three 
experiments, we investigated the factors that might lead speakers to adopt a non-self 
perspective. Participants described how objects were located in scenes that contained no 
other entity, a person, or a symmetrical plant. They were more likely to adopt a non-self 
perspective (e.g., using to the left to refer to an object on their own right) if the scene 
contained a person facing them than a person facing away or a plant, and if it contained a 
person who could see (and potentially act on) the object than a person who could not, even 
when that person showed no intention to act.  Our results suggest that speakers can put 
themselves in the shoes of another potential agent and use a simulation of that agent’s 
perspective as the basis for formulating their descriptions. 
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1 Introduction 
You are writing a new post for your blog about tourist frenzy, using your last holiday in Italy as 
an excuse. You have uploaded the picture you took of the Leaning Tower of Pisa and describe 
how, while you were carefully framing the photo to make it look as though a little rosebush on 
the left was holding the tower up, a tourist suddenly appeared on the right pretending to push 
the tower over.  Language allows us to describe space in a variety of ways, explicitly or 
implicitly locating things in relation to ourselves (e.g., on my left), to another object (e.g., to the 
left of the tower), or to fixed environmental features (e.g., to the north; Avraamides, Mello, & 
Greenauer, 2013; Levinson, 1996; Tversky, 1996). Speakers can always describe a scene from 
their self-perspective. In our example, you might describe the rosebush as being on the left 
because it is on the left with respect to your own left and right sides.i And of course, this self-
perspective would also correspond to the perspective of your audience as they view the photo 
on your blog. But speakers sometime describe locations from a different, non-self perspective. 
For instance, you might sometimes describe the rosebush as being on the right, even though 
this does not correspond to your own or your audience’s perspective. Why might people do 
so? In this paper, we investigate whether speakers might sometimes adopt a non-self 
perspective because they are influenced by features of the scene that they are describing, and 
explore whether such features critically involve another agent’s viewpoint or alternatively 
involve salient reference points.   
Models of language production assume that when speakers produce an utterance, they 
first determine the message that they wish to convey (i.e., form a particular communicative 
intention; conceptualisation), and then map this message onto appropriate linguistic 
representations (formulation; Levelt, 1989). The same state of affairs can be conceived in 
many different ways (i.e., is compatible with many messages), and so speakers must choose a 
particular way of viewing that state of affairs. In other words, they must think in a way that 
can serve as a basis for speaking (i.e., ‘thinking for speaking’; Slobin, 1987). For example, the 
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same arrangement of objects in space can be conceived from many different viewpoints. In 
our example, the rosebush and the leaning tower can be conceptualised from you and your 
audience’s viewpoint (in which the rosebush is to the left of the tower), or from the tourist’s 
viewpoint (in which the rosebush is behind the tower), or from the tower’s viewpoint (in 
which case the rosebush is in front of it).  
This means that in order to produce a spatial description, speakers must choose a 
particular spatial perspective from which to describe the position of one entity relative to 
another. That is, they must decide a point of reference or origin (e.g., the tourist) and a way of 
locating objects with respect to that origin, or reference frame (e.g., in terms of the tourist’s 
intrinsic axes, such as her vertical axis with her head being above her feet; Carlson, 1999).  
The origin and reference frame together determine how spatial terms (e.g., above, below, front, 
behind, left, and right) are interpreted (see also Carlson-Radvansky & Logan, 1997; Carlson-
Radvansky & Irwin, 1994; Herskovits, 1986; Levelt, 1984; Talmy, 1983). The ensuing message, 
specifying which elements are spatially related to each other, and how they are related, then 
forms the input to subsequent processes of linguistic formulation (e.g., lexical retrieval, 
grammatical encoding). 
How do speakers choose a particular perspective? They can always use themselves as 
the origin (i.e., adopt a self-perspective), and in fact speakers are assumed to use a self-
perspective as a default (Levelt, 1989; Pick & Lockman, 1981).ii But it is uncontroversial that 
speakers can take a non-self perspective if explicitly asked to do so (Bryant, Tversky, & 
Franklin, 1992).  Many studies have shown that speakers are also likely to spontaneously take 
a non-self perspective when producing a spatial description in interactive contexts that 
involve a joint spatial task (e.g., Mainwaring et al. 2003; Schober, 2009; see also Galati & 
Avraamides, 2013). In these cases, the decision to take a non-self perspective appears to be 
related to speakers’ beliefs about their addressees’ knowledge, understanding, or interests. In 
other words, speakers’ choice of which spatial perspective to adopt is probabilistically 
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influenced by audience design (Clark & Murphy, 1982), in the same way as - for example their - 
decisions about referential expressions or syntactic structure (Brennan & Clark, 1996; 
Haywood, Pickering, & Branigan, 2005).  
For instance, when speakers tell addressees where objects are located, they often 
produce descriptions relative to their addressees’ spatial perspective in order to help them 
reach the correct interpretation (Levelt, 1984; see also Bürkle, Nirmaier, & Herrmann, 1986; 
Herrmann, Bürkle, & Nirmaier, 1987). This tendency is stronger if the addressee is not co-
present  and so cannot negotiate a perspective or give feedback on understanding 
(Mainwaring, Tversky, Ohgishi, & Schiano, 2003; Schober, 1993; see also Tenbrink, 
Maiseyenka, & Moratz, 2007), and weaker when the spatial descriptions are irrelevant to the 
addressees’ task (Roche, Dale, & Kreuz, 2010; Yoon, Koh, & Brown-Schmidt, 2012).  
Speakers’ use of non-self perspectives is also influenced by their estimation of their 
addressees’ abilities to process and reconstruct the speaker’s perspective: Speakers with high 
spatial abilities are more likely to provide descriptions from their partner’s perspective if they 
perceive their partner to be less competent in spatial cognition, or to be having difficulties 
carrying out the task successfully (Schober, 2009). These findings demonstrate that speakers 
sometimes choose a non-self perspective when addressing someone who has an alternative 
perspective and who is involved in a joint spatial task (whether the addressee is co-present or 
not). Such audience design effects may involve quite explicit reasoning about addressees’ 
likely understanding and explicit simulation of their self-perspective.  
But other factors may also affect choice of perspective.  We know that speakers’ choices 
of referring expressions and syntactic structure do not depend entirely on considerations of 
audience design, but also depend probabilistically on factors such as visual salience to the 
speaker (Goudbeek & Krahmer, 2012) or ease of processing for the speaker (Bock, 1986; 
Ferreira & Dell, 2000); such factors may influence speakers’ decisions alongside 
considerations of audience design (Haywood et al., 2005). In the same way, recent studies 
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suggest that audience design is not the only determinant of speakers’ choice of spatial 
perspective.  
For example, Tversky and Hard (2009) found that that speakers were more likely to 
adopt a non-self perspective when they described the location of objects in a scene that 
contained an agent with a different spatial perspective than when they described the location 
of the same objects in a scene that did not contain such an agent. These effects occurred even 
though participants were not interacting with, or had any communicative intent towards, that 
agent. Thus when participants viewed a photographed scene and answered a question such as 
In relation to the bottle, where is the book? for an unspecified audience, they took a non-self 
perspective about a quarter of the time if the scene contained a person who had an opposite 
spatial perspective on the object (i.e., that person’s self-perspective that did not match the 
participant’s self-perspective) and who was either looking at or reaching for the object 
(compared to less than 5% of the time if the scene did not contain a person).   
Our concern in this paper is with such cases, where the adoption of a non-self 
perspective does not appear to have a basis in audience design: What features of the scene 
could have caused Tversky and Hard’s (2009) participants to adopt a non-self perspective? 
More generally, what factors other than audience design can affect speakers’ choice of 
perspective during the production of spatial descriptions? We contrast two types of account. 
According to an intentional account, speakers may take another (non-self) perspective when 
they detect the alternative viewpoint of another agent. In one version of this account, speakers 
are sensitive to the viewpoint of any agent that might have intentions (perceived intentional 
version); under another version, they are sensitive to the viewpoint of another agent that is 
currently acting or showing an intention to act (actional intentional version).  But according to 
a non-intentional account, speakers’ choice of spatial perspective may be affected by featural 
or functional aspects of the environment (e.g., a salient environmental feature that attracts 
speakers’ attention away from themselves and that provides a spatial reference point).   
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Consistent with an intentional account, some evidence suggests that speakers’ 
tendency to adopt a non-self perspective is linked to a need to understand other agents’ 
intentions or actions, even when the agent displaying these intentions and actions is not the 
addressee of the speaker’s utterance. In Tversky and Hard (2009), participants’ tendency to 
adopt a non-self perspective for scenes involving another person was enhanced if the question 
referred to an action (e.g., In relation to the bottle, where is the book placed?) than if it just 
referred to the location (In relation to the bottle, where is the book?). Other studies using 
similar paradigms showed that the tendency to take a non-self perspective was modulated by 
how explicitly the observed person was acting on the object (i.e., gazing vs. grasping; 
Mazzarella, Hamilton, Trojano, Matromauro & Conson, 2012). For instance, Furlanetto, 
Cavallo, Manera, Tversky, and Becchio (2013) presented participants with videos of a person 
who displayed a range from less to more explicit intentions to act (i.e., neutral, gazing, 
grasping). Participants’ tendency to produce non-self perspective descriptions increased as 
the agent’s discernible intentionality increased. 
However, people are not always sensitive to the presence of another agent. Surtees, 
Noordzij, and Apperly (2012) found that effects of agency depended on the context in which 
participants were exposed to scenes that included potential agents. In their study, participants 
judged the appropriateness of statements that described the position of a ball with respect to 
an agent-like (doll) or a non-agent-like (chair) referent. Some statements accurately described 
the position of the ball only if the participants considered their own perspective but not the 
referent’s perspective (i.e., they were appropriate only under the self-perspective); other 
statements accurately described the position of the ball only if the participants took the 
referent’s perspective but not their own (i.e., they were accurate only under the non-self 
perspective). When participants experienced both agent-like and non-agent-like referents in 
the same block of stimuli, they showed an effect of agency: They gave higher ratings for 
statements that were appropriate under the non-self perspective than to statements that were 
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inappropriate under the non-self perspective but appropriate under the self-perspective (thus 
displaying sensitivity to the non-self perspective), and this tendency was stronger when the 
referent was agent-like. But importantly, when participants experienced the two types of 
referent in separate blocks, the effect of agency disappeared (see also Clements-Stephens, 
Vasiljevic, Murray, & Shelton, 2013).   
In summary, some evidence suggests that speakers may implicitly adopt a non-self 
perspective as a result of perceiving the spatial perspective of another agent who 
demonstrates the potential for action, is currently engaged in action, or who evinces an 
intention to act. These results are compatible with an intentional account. To account for 
them, researchers have suggested that people engage in mental simulation when they detect 
another agent, engaging in a shift from themselves, the observer, to the observed person and 
simulating what the scene would look like from that position (e.g., Johnson & Demiris, 2005).  
However, other evidence supports a non-intentional account. For instance, some 
studies show that speakers’ use of a non-self perspective in their spatial descriptions is 
influenced by functional relationships between objects, even in the absence of an alternative 
viewpoint or any evidence of agency. Carlson-Radvansky and Radvansky (1996) found that 
when people were presented with isolated pairs of functionally-related objects (e.g., hammer 
and nail), they tended to use a non-self perspective that was based on the directional features 
of one object to describe the location of the other object (e.g., “the nail is in front of the 
hammer” rather than “the nail is to the right of the hammer”; see also Johannsen & De Ruiter, 
2013a).  
Studies using non-linguistic spatial perspective-taking tasks also support a non-
intentional account. These studies suggest that the properties of inanimate entities can affect 
how people adopt a spatial perspective. For example, participants showed interference when 
locating dots on a computer display if there was a conflict between their perspective and the 
‘perspective’ of a moving symmetrical triangle to which they had attributed left/right sides 
9 
(based on its directionality of motion; Zwickel, 2009).  
More critically, findings from non-linguistic tasks suggest that attention-orienting 
mechanisms can affect spatial perspective-taking independently of perceptions of agency, in 
keeping with Heyes’ (2014) proposal that many entities have attention-eliciting features that 
can lead people to code spatial responses according to their intrinsic axes; for example, 
people’s attention may be drawn to an entity’s front by its eyes or mouth (in the case of a 
person) or its control panel (in the case of a machine), so that they tend to use this axis in a 
subsequent spatial response. Santiesteban, Catmur, Hopkins, Bird, and Heyes (2014) had 
participants count the number of dots on a screen. On some trials, a human-like avatar or a 
pointing arrow was present on the screen. Participants’ response latency and accuracy were 
affected to the same extent when the arrow’s directional features (i.e., the arrow’s tip) pointed 
to a subset of the dots as when the avatar’s directional features (i.e., the avatar’s head) did so, 
suggesting no effect of agency.  Although these results do not involve language, they challenge 
the intentional account – in other words, that it is the perception of another agent’s viewpoint 
that can trigger speakers to adopt a non-self perspective.  
In sum, spatial language use, and specifically speakers’ choice of perspective, does 
not depend solely on consideration of an addressees’ immediate comprehension needs: 
Speakers sometimes adopt a non-self perspective when producing spatial descriptions of 
scenes that contain another person who is not the addressee. But findings are contradictory 
about the factors that trigger speakers to adopt a non-self perspective. Some findings support 
an intentional account that involves perceptions of agency, whereas other findings (largely 
from non-linguistic spatial tasks) support a non-intentional account that involves the presence 
of salient reference points.  
The current study 
Our study set out to examine what might cause people to adopt a non-self perspective when 
producing spatial descriptions, other than attempting to meet the needs of their addressees. 
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Specifically, we investigated what is it about an entity that affects whether speakers describe 
its location using a non-self perspective: Are speakers influenced by the presence of an entity 
with an alternative viewpoint and by the actual or potential agency of that entity? Or are 
speakers influenced instead by whether an entity has a good source of spatial coordinates? 
Building on the task used by Tversky and Hard (2009), we had participants describe 
the spatial relation between two objects (e.g., a candle and a pineapple) in a photographed 
scene in response to the question On which side of the X is the Y? (see Figure 1). The objects 
were symmetrical and had no functional relationship to each other. We manipulated whether 
the scene included a non-agentive entity (e.g., a plant), an agentive entity (i.e., a person) that 
was not acting and showed no intention to act, or no additional entity. We also manipulated 
where that entity was positioned with respect to the two objects, so that the agentive entity 
either could or could not perceive the objects. We measured the effect of these manipulations 
on whether participants used a self-perspective in their spatial descriptions (e.g., The candle is 
to the left of the pineapple to describe a scene such as Figure 1), or whether they instead 
adopted a non-self perspective (e.g., The candle is to the right of the pineapple). 
In our task, the questions referred only to the two objects on the table. Hence our 
task did not ask participants to take into account the spatial relation between the objects and 
the additional entity. This is important as previous studies displaying only one object 
alongside the additional key entity (e.g., a person) may have induced participants to base their 
spatial descriptions on this additional entity, making the task inadvertently biased towards a 
non-self perspective (Mazzarella et al., 2012). As in many previous studies (e.g., Carlson-
Radvansky & Radvansky, 1996; Tversky & Hard, 2009), the task required participants to 
produce descriptions for an unspecified audience; participants had no reason to believe that 
the photographed person who was present in the scene should be considered the addressee of 
these descriptions (i.e., the person who needed to understand them).  
In Experiment 1, we tested whether participants produced more non-self 
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perspectives when describing the location of one object relative to another object in a scene 
containing a human who was in a neutral pose and whose orientation differed from the 
participant’s orientation (agentive entity condition) than a scene that contained a plant (non-
agentive entity condition) or no additional entity (no entity condition). We further tested 
whether any such effect was affected by whether the human could see and potentially act on 
the object.  
In Experiment 2, we manipulated the order of presentation of the three entity 
conditions (agentive vs. non-agentive vs. no entity) using a blocked design, in order to test 
whether non-self perspective-taking was influenced by the experimental context. Specifically, 
we examined whether scenes involving a non-agentive entity could always induce a non-self 
perspective, or whether participants adopted a non-self perspective in non-agentive trials only 
if they had previously used that perspective in agentive trials.  
In Experiment 3, we manipulated the orientation of the human so that it faced in the 
same or the opposite direction to the participant, to examine whether non-self perspective-
taking was affected by another agent’s perspective when this perspective corresponded to the 
participant’s own perspective as well as when it constituted an alternative perspective. 
Differences in patterns of non-self perspective descriptions between conditions would be 
informative about the extent to which speakers producing spatial descriptions are triggered to 
take a non-self perspective by the detection of an agent that might have intentions (i.e., 
consistent with the perceived version of the intentional account), the detection of an agent 
evincing a current action or intention to act (i.e., consistent with the actional version of the 
intentional account), or an entity with salient directional intrinsic features (i.e., consistent 
with the non-intentional account). 
2 Experiment 1 
In this experiment, participants produced spatial descriptions for scenes containing an 
agentive entity, a non-agentive entity, or no additional entity (ENTITY manipulation). The 
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agentive entity was a human in a stationary pose. The human was facing forward and had 
crossed arms; he or she was not engaged in action and did not evince any clear intention to act 
(e.g., reaching for or looking at an object). This pose also ensured that the human displayed no 
attention-orienting cues caused by specific asymmetric postures (e.g., head turned, one arm 
stretched out). The non-agentive entity was a plant, which was closely matched in size to the 
human and had no directional features.  We assume that people do not regard this plant (or, 
most likely, plants in general) as intentional or as having a perspective or distinct front/back 
or left/right sides.  
We also manipulated whether the agentive or non-agentive entity appeared in front 
of or behind the objects (LOCATION manipulation). Crucially, the agentive entity always faced 
the participant so that its orientation and viewpoint were the opposite of the participant’s 
(see Figure 1). As a consequence, the entity could potentially see and act on the objects (i.e., 
participants could perceive a non-self relative perspective) only in the Agent-Behind condition 
(Figure 1d). 
Under the perceived intentional account, participants should be more likely to 
produce a non-self description (e.g., the candle is to the right of the pineapple) when they 
perceive the entity to be intentional and to have a perspective corresponding to a non-self 
relative perspective; moreover this tendency should not depend on the entity carrying out an 
observable action or showing intention to act. This should be the case in the Agent-Behind 
condition (Figure 1d). It should not be the case in the Agent-Front condition (Figure 1c) 
because the entity would not be able to see or act on the objects (i.e., the entity does not 
provide an alternative relative perspective). More obviously, it should not occur in either of the 
non-agent conditions; in the Non-agent-Behind condition, even if participants were to 
simulate themselves in the position of the plant, there is no reason why they should assume it 
to be facing them.  
Under the actional intentional account, participants’ tendency to produce non-self 
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descriptions should not be affected by the entity (agent vs. non-agent) or its position (agent-
front or agent-behind), because the agent (and, obviously, the non-agent) displayed no action 
or intention to act.  Participants should therefore be equally likely to produce non-self 
descriptions in all conditions. 
Under the non-intentional account, in contrast, both Agent conditions should trigger 
more non-self perspectives than the Non-agent conditions and the No-entity condition, 
because people have salient directional intrinsic features that can be used as a basis for coding 
a spatial response, whereas plants do not.  In addition, there should be no difference between 
the Agent-Behind and the Agent-Front conditions because the directional features of the 
human body do not change between the two conditions. 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants 
We recruited 144 participants on CrowdFlower, a crowdsourcing self-service platform that 
allows clients to design and execute their own workflow (and allows full anonymity). All 
participants were English native speakers and were paid $0.40. 
2.1.2 Materials  
We used twelve experimental items. Each item involved a pair of experimental 
objects that had no clear front/behind or left/right (e.g., candle/pineapple). We constructed 
two sets of photographed scenes for each item, one set for each possible position of the two 
objects on the table (i.e., candle on the right and pineapple on the left vs. candle on the left and 
pineapple on the right). Each set comprised five photographs, corresponding to the four 
combinations of ENTITY (Agent vs. Non-agent) and LOCATION (Front vs. Behind), and the NO 
ENTITY control. See Figure 1. In the ENTITY conditions, we used four plants and four people 
(two female, two male). Each scene was paired with a question of the form On which side of X is 
Y? (e.g., On which side of the candle is the pineapple?). Across the item set, each object appeared 
on the left and right an equal number of times, and was asked about an equal number of times; 
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each person/plant appeared front/behind an equal number of times. 
We also constructed 16 filler items, each displaying two further objects on a table. In 
half the fillers, objects were different colours (e.g., a red baking tin and a green salad bowl) 
and participants were asked What colour is the X? (e.g., What colour is the salad bowl?) In the 
other half, objects were of different size (e.g., a tube of toothpaste and a sewing machine) and 
participants were asked With respect to the X, how big is the Y? (e.g., With respect to the 
toothpaste, how big is the sewing machine?) 
We created 12 lists, each comprising 24 experimental and 16 filler trials. Each list 
comprised eight ENTITY/Agent trials (four Front, four Behind), 8 ENTITY/Non-agent trials (four 
Front, four Behind) and eight NO ENTITY trials. In each list, each of the twelve experimental 
items was assigned to two of the conditions, in such a way that it never appeared twice in the 
same ENTITY/LOCATION condition. The sequencing of experimental and filler trials was fixed 
across all lists so that there were never more than two consecutive experimental trials.  We 
created six versions of each list by randomizing the order of experimental items and filler 
items, with the constraint that across lists, the first trial was an Agent, Non-agent, or No Entity 
trial an equal number of times (i.e., six), yielding 72 lists. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of the lists (two participants per list). 
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Figure 1 Example of a set of photograph scenes (item candle/pineapple) used in Experiment 1 and in 
Experiment 2: (a) Non-agent Front; (b) Non-agent Behind; (c) Agent Front; (d) Agent Behind; (e) No 
Entity. 
 
2.1.3 Design 
We manipulated: whether an Agent (person) or a Non-agent (plant) was present in the scene 
between the two objects (additional ENTITY); whether the entity was located in front or behind 
the objects (LOCATION). The study used an incomplete within-subjects factorial design with NO 
ENTITY as baseline and a 2×2 design with ENTITY (Agent vs. Non-agent) and LOCATION (Front vs. 
Behind) as factors. 
2.1.4 Procedure 
On the CrowdFlower platform, participants read the information introducing the study and 
gave their informed consent to take part. They were then asked to follow a link to an external 
website, hosted on the university's server, where the experiment was run. By clicking on the 
link, they were randomly assigned to one of the 72 experimental lists. The first page described 
the task, informing participants that they would see a series of photographs of scenes and 
would be asked a question about their content. Scenes were 600×400px and were displayed in 
the centre of the screen. The question (e.g., On which side of the candle is the pineapple?) and 
appeared on the screen below the scene at the same time as the scene itself. Participants 
typed in their answer and pressed Enter to continue on to the next trial. 
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2.2 Data analysis 
2.2.1 Coding and exclusion criteria 
Twelve participants provided no responses. We eliminated 72 of the experimental trials 
because the photo did not upload, participants typed in nonsense strings of characters, or 
participants did not answer the question asked. We ended up with 3096 data points from 132 
subjects (1017 in the Agent, 1043 in the Non-Agent, and 1035 in the No Entity condition). Of 
the 3096 responses, 3095 were categorized as mentioning that the object was on the right 
(e.g., right, right side, to the right) or on the left (e.g., left, left side, to the left) with respect to 
the other object on the table and were included for analysis. One response (in the Agent-
behind condition) mentioned both left and right (i.e., my left, his right) and was excluded. 
Responses were coded as ‘self’ if the position of the object was described from the 
participant's perspective and ‘non-self’ otherwise. 
2.2.2 Models 
We used mixed logit regression analysis with crossed random effects (Jaeger, 2008) to predict 
participants’ likelihood to describe the spatial location of objects from a non-self perspective 
(DV: 'non-self' response = 1; 'self' response = 0) based on ENTITY and LOCATION. The crossed 
hierarchical nature of the model allows explicit estimation of by-participant and by-item 
individual differences. Predictors were coded with deviation contrasts (levels: -.5/.5) to 
reduce collinearity and obtain ANOVA-like interpretation of main effects. Their regression 
coefficient represents the difference on the log-odds scale in producing a non-self description 
between the two levels of the predictor. A significant positive log-odds corresponds to a higher 
log-odds (and so a higher probability) to produce a non-self description for the predictor level 
coded positively (i.e., .5). We also report odds-ratio (i.e., explog-odds).  
The maximal by-participants and by-items random structure justified by the design 
was included to avoid anti-conservatism (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). All models were 
fitted using the lme4 package (version 1.1-21) (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker 2015) in R 
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(version 3.5.2) (R Code Team, 2018). In the event of failed convergence or singular fit, a sign of 
over-parameterization of the model’s random structure, we followed Barr et al. (2013) and re-
fitted the model after removing the random-effect terms required to allow a non-singular fit.  
The significance of the predictors (i.e., the model fixed-effect parameter estimates) was 
evaluated via Wald's Z statistic, which assesses whether the fixed-effects coefficients are 
significantly different from zero (given the estimated S.E.).  
2.3 Results 
Overall, participants took a non-self perspective on 11% of trials. 44 participants (i.e., 33% of 
participants) never produced descriptions from a non-self perspective; in contrast, only 1 
participant (i.e., 0.75% of participants) always produced descriptions from a non-self 
perspective.  Table 1 and Figure 2 show frequency and proportion of non-self descriptions by 
ENTITY and LOCATION condition. 
 
Table 1 
Frequency of self and non-self perspectives by 
ENTITY and LOCATION (N = 3059) in Experiment 1 
  Perspective Responses 
Entity Location Self Non-self 
Agent Front 448 50 
 Behind 446 73 
Non-agent Front 474 49 
 Behind 455 65 
No Entity  932 103 
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Figure 2 Observed proportions of non-self descriptions in the five experimental conditions (Experiment 
1). Error bars represent non-parametrically bootstrapped (BCa) 95% confidence intervals on the 
participant-wise conditional means. 
 
In order to assess whether the presence in the scene of an agentive vs. non-agentive 
additional entity influenced participants' perspective, and whether this was further mediated 
by the location of the entity with respect to the objects, we ran a mixed-effects logistic 
regression with ENTITY (Agent = .5/Non-agent = -.5), LOCATION (Behind = .5/ Front =-.5) and 
their interaction as fixed effects, and maximal random structure. The results showed that 
participants were more likely to take a non-self perspective when an additional entity 
appeared in the scene, located behind the table, as shown by the significant positive coefficient 
for LOCATION (p < .01). LOCATION did not interact with ENTITY (p > .5), indicating that the effect 
was not mediated by whether or not the additional entity was agentive (p > .5). The summary 
of the model is given in Table 2.  
To confirm that our data supported the null hypothesis of no interaction between 
ENTITY and LOCATION, we performed a Bayes Factor analysis, which quantifies the likelihood of 
observing the data if agentive and non-agentive entities lead to different patterns of non-self 
descriptions in the behind and front conditions, compared to if they do not (Wagenmakers, 
2007). We constructed the null-model, a GLMM with only the main fixed effects of ENTITY and 
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LOCATION and the same random structure as the original model; this model assumes that 
agents and non-agents do not differently affect perspective in the behind and front locations. 
The alternative model is our original model that includes the ENTITY by LOCATION interaction. 
We then used the two models’ Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) values to estimate the 
Bayes Factor as e(BIC_alternative – BIC_null)/2 (Wagenmakers, 2007; Masson, 2011). The null model 
(i.e., without the LOCATION by ENTITY interaction) fit the data better by a Bayes Factor of e(1247.9 – 
1240.5)/2 = 40.5, providing strong evidence against the hypothesis that the agentive entity led to 
a different patterns of spatial descriptions in the behind versus front location compared to the 
non-agentive entity (posterior probability in favour of the null-model BF/(BF + 1) = .98, which 
represents strong evidence according to Raftery’s, 1995, categorization). 
 
Table 2 
Summary of the mixed logit model with Entity (Agent = .5 / Non-agent = -.5) and 
Location (Behind = .5 / Front = -.5) as predictors for Experiment 1 (N=2060)1 
Predictors 
(fixed effects) 
Parameter estimates  Wald's test 
 Log-odds (β) S.E. Odds Ratio [95% CI] 
 
Z p(β = 0) 
Intercept -3.56 .30 0.03  [0.02; 0.05] -11.95  
Entity -0.14 .51 0.87  [0.32; 2.37] -0.27 .790 
Location 1.60 .56 4.94  [1.66; 14.74] 2.86 .004 
Entity: Location 0.40 1.01 1.49  [0.21; 10.82] 0.35 .693 
Random effects  Explained standard deviation estimates   
Subjects:(intercept)  2.05      
Subjects: Entity  1.62 .25     
Subject: Location  1.03 -.95 -.36    
Subject: Ent:Loc  1.89 -.24 -.81 .50   
Items: Location  0.99      
Items: Ent:Loc  0.69      
1 Because of singularity issues, random-effect terms estimated to -1/1 (if correlations) or to 
zero (if variance) were iteratively removed until this led to a non-singular fit of the model. All 
correlations between fixed-effects < |.7| 
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To verify whether participants produced more non-self perspectives when any 
additional entity was present in the scene than when no additional entity was present (cf. 
Tversky & Hard, 2009), we performed an additional mixed logit analysis comparing the NO 
ENTITY baseline with the individual four levels of the 2×2 design. To do this, we created one 
factor representing each combination of ENTITY and LOCATION, and then converted this factor to 
a deviation-coding numeric representation. The model summary is presented in Table 3. No 
difference was observed for either type of entity in the Front (ps > .2) or in the Behind 
condition (ps > .2) compared to the NO ENTITY baseline.  
 
Table 3 
Summary of the mixed logit model comparing the No Entity baseline and the four unique 
combinations of Entity and Location via deviation coding in Experiment 1 (N=3095)1. 
Regression coefficients represent the difference to produce a non-self description (on the 
logit scale) between the specified Entity-Location and the No Entity.  
Predictors 
(fixed effects) 
 Parameter estimates Wald's test 
  Log-odds (β) S.E. Odds Ratio [95% CI] Z p( β = 0) 
Intercept -3.50 0.26 0.03  [0.02; 0.05] -13.48  
Agent/Front (d) -0.30 0.36 0.74  [0.36; 1.50] -0.84 0.404 
Agent/Behind (d) 0.41 0.36 1.51  [0.75; 3.03] 1.15 0.251 
Non-agent/Front (d) -0.39 0.34 0.68  [0.35; 1.33] -1.13 0.257 
Non-agent/Behind (d) 0.24 0.34 1.27 [0.66; 2.46]   0.71 0.479 
 Random effects  Explained standard deviation estimates   
Subjects: (intercept) 2.02       
Subjects: Ag/Fro 1.43       
Subject: Ag/Beh 1.00       
Subject: NnAg/Fro 0.94       
Subject: NnAg/Fro 0.95       
Items: (intercept) 0.18       
Items: Ag/Beh 0.84       
Items: NnAg/Fro 0.36       
Items: NnAg/Beh 0.74       
1 Because of singularity issues, random-effect terms estimated to -1/1 (if correlations) or to zero 
(if variance) were iteratively removed until this led to a non-singular fit of the model. Highest 
correlation between fixed effects, r = 0.19. 
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2.4 Discussion 
When describing the location of an object relative to another object, participants took a self-
perspective more frequently than a non-self perspective. These results are consistent with the 
assumption that speakers tend to adopt a self-perspective by default (Levelt, 1989). However, 
they were more likely to adopt a non-self perspective when the scene contained an additional 
entity that appeared behind the table (i.e., on the other side of the table, relative to the 
participant) than when it contained an additional entity that appeared in front of the table (on 
the same side of the table, relative to the participant). This tendency was not affected by 
whether the additional entity was agentive (a human) or non-agentive (a plant). 
These results support previous findings that speakers’ choice of spatial perspective 
may be influenced by non-communicative factors (e.g., Tversky & Hard, 2009).  They are 
incompatible with the non-intentional account, as the plants did not have directional features 
that could attract attention and the humans’ directional features were the same in the agent-
front and agent-behind conditions. They are also incompatible with an actional intentional 
account, as the humans (and obviously the plants) were not acting on, or showing an intention 
to act on, the objects. In contrast, they are compatible with the perceived intentional account – 
but only if participants treated the non-agent as intentional and forward-facing.   
If they did so, they may have transferred its intentionality and direction from the 
Agent condition. In accord with this possibility, some research suggests that spatial 
perspective-taking can be affected by experimental experience. Clements-Stephans et al. 
(2012) found that the orientation of featureless triangles affected how well participants 
determined from which triangle’s position a series of pictures had been taken.  But this only 
occurred when participants had previously been exposed to triangles depicted with eyes 
(hence, encouraging them to attribute intentionality to the triangles).  In a similar way, 
participants might have adopted a non-self perspective for trials containing a person, and then 
transferred this perspective to scenes that included plants appearing in the same location as 
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the person (see also Ryskin, Brown-Schmidt, Canseco-Gonzalez, Yiu, & Nguyen, 2014; Ryskin, 
Wang, & Brown-Schmidt, 2016, for evidence of persistence in spatial perspective-taking).  
In addition, we did not find that participants produced more non-self descriptions 
when an additional entity was in the scene compared to the baseline with no additional entity. 
This was the case for all four Entity-Location conditions. This finding reinforces the 
assumption that self-perspective is a strong default option for speakers. However, it may also 
be the result of the experimental setting, with participants being exposed to the different 
experimental conditions in a highly alternating way; similarly to what may have happened for 
the agent and no-agent conditions in the behind Location, the experimental context may have 
led participants to sometimes produce a non-self perspective even when no additional entity 
was in the scene. 
To test these possibilities, we controlled for possible carry-over effects between trials 
in Experiment 2 by presenting the agentive (person) stimuli, the non-agentive (plant) stimuli 
and the no-entity stimuli in blocks.  
3 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 manipulated the same factors as Experiment 1, but the three Entity conditions 
were presented in different blocks, with blocks counterbalanced for order of presentation 
across participants.  If the perceived intentional account is correct but the results of the non-
agentive conditions in Experiment 1 occurred because participants transferred 
intentionality/orientation from the Agent stimuli to the Non-agent stimuli, then participants 
should produce more non-self descriptions for the Agent-Behind conditions compared to the 
Agent-Front conditions, but no such tendency for them to produce more non-self descriptions 
for the Non-agent-Behind conditions. We should also find that participants should produce 
fewer non-self perspectives in the no-entity baseline compared to the Agent-Behind condition. 
3.1 Methods 
The experiment was identical to Experiment 1 except as specified in sections 3.1.1-3.1.3 
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below. 
3.1.1 Participants 
We recruited 288 participants from the same population as Experiment 1 to take part in the 
online experiment, under the same conditions. 
3.1.2 Materials 
We used the same stimuli and the same ratio between experimental and filler trials as in 
Experiment 1, with 8 experimental and 5 filler trials per block. We constructed six versions of 
each of the 12 lists of trials, one version for each order of the blocks (Non-agent –Agent – No 
Entity; Non-agent – No Entity – Agent; Agent – Non-agent – No Entity; Agent – No Entity – 
Non-agent; No Entity – Nonagent – Agent; No Entity – Agent – Non-agent), for a total of 72 
lists. Four participants were randomly assigned to each list. To avoid carryover effects, a filler 
trial always occurred between the end of one block and the beginning of the next block. We 
also created three sequences of experimental and filler trials making sure that there were no 
more than two consecutive experimental trials, and that each block order was combined with 
each sequence order. 
3.1.3 Procedure  
At the end of the experiment, participants reported their gender, first language, and age. 
3.2 Data analysis 
3.2.1 Coding and exclusion criteria 
We excluded 52 participants (18%) who had taken part in Experiment 1, 23 participants (8%) 
for whom English was not their first language, and 3 participants (1%) who provided no 
responses. We further excluded 1 participant who acknowledged that more than one 
perspective was possible but did not provide any (e.g., It all depends on perspective), 1 
participant who described the location of the objects without taking any perspective (e.g., 
opposite), and 1 participant who explicitly took both perspectives (e.g., my right, the cup's left) 
for all experimental trials. Fifteen experimental trials were excluded from analysis because of 
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technical issues with photo uploading or the participants provided no response. This led to 
4947 observations from 207 participants which were used for analysis (1639 in the Agent, 
1653 in the Non-agent, and 1655 in the No Entity condition). 
3.3 Results 
On average, participants took a non-self perspective on 11.2% of trials. 88 participants (i.e., 
43% of participants) never produced descriptions from a non-self perspective; in contrast, 
only 4 participants (i.e., 1.9% of participants) always produced descriptions from a non-self 
perspective. Table 4 and Figure 4 show the frequency and proportion of non-self descriptions 
by ENTITY and LOCATION condition. 
 
 
Table 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Frequency of self and non-self descriptions by  ENTITY 
and LOCATION (N = 4947) in Experiment 2 
  Perspective Responses 
Entity Location Self Non-self 
Agent Front 727 101 
 Behind 684 127 
Non-agent Front 750 78 
 Behind 748 77 
No Entity  1486 169 
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Figure 3 Observed proportions of non-self descriptions in the five experimental conditions (Experiment 
2). Error bars represent non-parametrically bootstrapped (BCa) 95% confidence intervals on the 
participant-wise conditional means. 
 
 
A logit mixed model analysis was used to model outcomes. No effect of ENTITY (p > .9) 
or LOCATION (p > .1) was found. Crucially, there was a significant interaction between these two 
factors (p < .05); participants were more likely to take a non-self perspective to describe the 
spatial location of objects when an agentive entity but not a non-agentive entity was in the 
scene, and was located behind the objects. A summary of the model is given in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 5 
Summary of the mixed logit model with Entity (Agent = .5, / Non-agent = -.5) and Location 
(Behind = .5 / Front = -.5) as predictors for Experiment 2 (N=3292)1 
Predictors 
(fixed effects) 
Parameter estimates    Wald's test 
 Log-odds (β) S.E. Odds Ratio  [95% CI] Z p(β = 0) 
Intercept  -4.41 0.37 0.01  [0.00; 0.02] -12.06  
Entity  0.02 0.62 1.02  [0.30; 3.42] 0.03 .976 
Location  0.59 0.58 1.75  [0.56; 5.43] 0.97 .334 
Entity:Location  2.54 1.13 12.68  [1.39; 115.59] 2.25 .024 
Random effects  Explained standard deviation estimates    
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Subjects: (intercept) 2.81        
Subjects: Entity 2.24 0.33       
Subject: Location 1.28 -0.28 -0.27      
Subject: Ent:Loc 2.22 -0.85 -0.30 0.45     
Items: Entity 0.70        
Items: Location 0.37        
Items: Ent:Loc 0.87        
1 Because of singularity issues, random-effect terms estimated to -1/1 (if correlations) or to zero (if 
variance) were iteratively removed until this led to a non-singular fit of the model. Highest 
correlation between fixed effects < |.36|. 
 
 
As with Experiment 1, we then tested whether participants’ likelihood of describing 
the scenes from a non-self perspective differed in the four entity conditions compared to when 
no additional entity was in the scene. We ran a mixed logit analysis comparing the NO ENTITY 
baseline with the individual four levels of the 2×2 design (see section 2.3 for details). The 
model summary is presented in Table 6. No difference was observed for any conditions 
(ps > .1). 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Summary of the mixed logit model comparing the No Entity baseline and the four unique 
combinations of Entity and Location via deviation coding in Experiment 2 (N=4947)1. 
Regression coefficients represent the difference to produce a non-self description (on the 
logit scale) between the specified Entity-Location and the No Entity.  
Predictors 
(fixed effects) 
 Parameter estimates Wald's test 
  Log-odds (β) S.E. Odds Ratio [95% CI] Z p( β = 0) 
Intercept -4.14 0.28 0.01  [0.06; 0.03] -14.64  
Agent/Front (d) -1.11 0.75 0.33  [0.07; 1.43] -1.47 0.137 
Agent/Behind (d) 0.40 0.54 1.48  [0.51; 4.30] 0.73 0.467 
Non-agent/Front (d) 0.22 0.47 1.25  [0.50; 3.12]  0.48 0.632 
Non-agent/Behind (d) -0.33 0.56 0.72  [0.24; 2.14] -0.59 0.552 
 Random effects  Explained standard deviation estimates   
Subjects: (intercept) 2.64       
Subjects: Ag/Fro 2.82  0.42      
Subject: Ag/Beh 1.82  0.18 0.76     
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Subject: NnAg/Fro 0.93 -0.42 0.30 -0.13   
Subject: NnAg/Fro 1.09  0.11 0.35  0.20  0.43   
Items: Ag/Fro 0.07       
Items: Ag/Beh 0.83       
Items: NnAg/Fro 0.20      
1 Because of singularity issues, random-effect terms estimated to -1/1 (if correlations) or to zero 
(if variance) were iteratively removed until this led to a non-singular fit of the model. Highest 
correlation between fixed effects, r = 0.40. 
 
 
To investigate whether exposure to other experimental conditions may have affected 
how participants responded to the no-entity baseline (i.e., no significant difference in non-self 
perspective use between the baseline and any of the entity conditions) despite the blocked 
design, we ran an additional exploratory analysis on Block 1 only, in order to isolate the effect 
of first exposure to each ENTITY condition. Figure 4 shows the proportion of non-self 
descriptions in Block 1 only. In a mixed logit model, we included the deviation-coding numeric 
predictor comparing each individual ENTITY - LOCATION condition against the NO ENTITY 
baseline as fixed effects, and the full random structure justified by the design (by-participants, 
this only included random intercept). Only the Agent-Behind condition triggered significantly 
more non-self perspective descriptions compared to the NO ENTITY baseline (β = 2.04, S.E. 
= .68, odds-ratio= 7.70, 95% CI [2.02; 29.38], p = 0.003); all other comparisons were not 
significant (ps > .05). 
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Figure 4 Observed proportions of non-self descriptions in Block 1 of Experiment 2. Error bars represent 
non-parametrically bootstrapped (BCa) 95% confidence intervals on the participant-wise conditional 
means. 
 
 
3.4 Discussion 
When participants described Agent, Non-agent, or No Entity scenes in a blocked presentation, 
they were consistently more likely to adopt the non-self perspective in the Agent-Behind 
condition compared to the Agent-Front condition (as in Experiment 1). However, they showed 
no such tendency in the Non-Agent conditions. These findings therefore support the perceived 
intentional account, and suggest that in Experiment 1, participants transferred intentionality 
and orientation from agents (humans) to non-agents (plants). Additionally, in Experiment 2 
participants were more likely to describe the scene from a non-self perspective in the Agent-
Behind condition compared to the No Entity baseline, but in Block 1 only, i.e., when 
participants first experienced the task and were exposed to only one Entity condition. One 
possible explanation for why the effect of Agent-Behind vs. No Entity did not occur when the 
data from the three blocks were collapsed into a single analysis is the variability in the effect 
induced by the exposure to other experimental conditions.  
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4 Experiment 3 
Taken together, Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that speakers’ tendency to adopt a non-self 
perspective can be affected by the presence of an agentive entity that has a different viewpoint 
from themselves and that evinces no current action or intention to act. Both experiments 
found more non-self descriptions in the Agent-Behind conditions (where the agent could 
potentially see and act on the described objects) than in the Agent-Front conditions (where 
the agent could not). In both experiments, the agent’s perspective contrasted with the 
speaker’s. Our results are not consistent with the non-intentional account (which assigns no 
role to agency), or the actional intentional account (which requires the agent to evince action 
or an intention to act).  Instead they support the perceived intentional account, in which 
speakers’ choice of perspective is influenced by their perception of the agent’s ability to see or 
act on objects.  
 Hence Experiments 1 and 2 identify one factor affecting speakers’ choice of spatial 
perspective that is not related to audience design considerations: the perception of an agent 
with the potential for action.  But Experiments 1 and 2 always involved scenes in which the 
agent had the opposite orientation, and so an opposite perspective, from the speaker. Is 
speakers’ choice of perspective affected by the presence of an agent with the potential for 
action only when it has an opposite orientation to their own? Or is speakers’ choice of 
perspective also affected by the perception of an agent with the potential for action even when 
it has the same orientation as their own?  
 In Experiment 3, we addressed this question by focusing on scenes involving an 
agentive entity. We manipulated whether the agent could or could not act on the objects, and 
whether the agent had the same orientation as the participant or the opposite orientation. 
Thus as in Experiments 1 and 2, we included conditions in which the agent had the opposite 
orientation to the participant and either could act on the objects (5a; Can act-Opposite 
orientation condition, corresponding to the Agent-Behind condition in Experiments 1 and 2) 
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or could not act on the objects (5b; Cannot act-Opposite orientation condition, corresponding 
to the Agent-Front condition in Experiments 1 and 2). But we additionally included conditions 
in which the agent had the same orientation as the participant and either could act on the 
objects (5c; Can act-Same orientation condition) or could not act on the objects (5d; Cannot 
act-Same orientation condition).  
 Experiments 1 and 2 showed that speakers would be more likely to produce non-self 
descriptions when the scene contained an agent that had the opposite orientation to their own 
and that could act on the objects (Can act-Opposite orientation condition; 5a) than when the 
scene contained an agent that had the opposite orientation to their own and that could not act 
on the objects (Cannot act-Opposite orientation condition; 5b).  If the pattern in Experiments 
1 and 2 occurred because speakers are more likely to take the perspective of an agent that can 
act on objects than an agent that cannot act on objects only if that agent has the opposite 
orientation to their own, then participants should produce more non-self descriptions in the 
Can act-Opposite orientation condition than in the Cannot act-Opposite orientation condition 
(i.e., as in Experiments 1 and 2) – but we would not expect to find differences in the use of 
non-self descriptions between the Can act-Same orientation and Cannot act-Same orientation 
conditions. This hypothesis predicts an interaction between the agent’s orientation and their 
potential to act, and a simple effect of action potential within the Opposite but not the Same 
orientation condition. 
In contrast, if this finding was because speakers are more likely to take the perspective 
of any agent that can act on objects (irrespective of its orientation) than an agent that cannot 
act on objects, then participants should again produce more non-self descriptions in the Can 
act-Opposite orientation condition (Figure 5a) than in the Cannot act-Opposite orientation 
condition (Figure 5b) (i.e., as in Experiments 1 and 2) - but moreover they should produce 
fewer non-self descriptions (i.e., more self-descriptions) in the Can act-Same orientation 
condition (Figure 5c) than in the Cannot act-Same orientation condition (Figure 5d), because 
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in the Can act-Same orientation condition the agent’s perspective corresponds to, and hence 
reinforces, the speaker’s own (i.e., self-) perspective. This hypothesis predicts an interaction 
between the agent’s orientation and their potential to act, and a simple effect of action 
potential within both the Opposite orientation and the Same orientation conditions, (with a 
positive effect in the Opposite orientation condition, and a negative effect in the Same 
orientation condition). 
4.1 Methods 
The experiment was identical to Experiment 1 except as specified in sections 4.1.1-4.1.4-
below. 
4.1.1 Participants 
288 participants took part in the online experiment. 
4.1.2 Materials 
We created 12 experimental items. As in Experiment 1, an item involved two experimental 
objects with no clear front/behind or left/right. For each item, we created two sets of five 
photographed scene: one set for each possible position of the two objects on the table (see 
Experiment 1), each set comprising five photographs corresponding to NO ENTITY, and the four 
unique combinations of ACTION POTENTIAL and ORIENTATION (see Figure 5). 
We then created 12 lists, each comprising 24 experimental and 16 filler trials. Overall, 
each list contained 8 No Entity conditions and 16 Agent conditions, 4 for each combination of 
ACTION POTENTIAL and ORIENTATION. In each list, each item appeared twice but never in the same 
condition, and participants were asked about the position of each individual object only once. 
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Figure 5 Example of a set of photographed scenes (item: pineapple/candle) used in Experiment 3 
 
4.1.3 Design 
As in the previous experiments, participants saw photos of scenes in which two objects were 
located on the opposite sides of a table. They described the spatial relation between the two 
objects by answering the question: On which side of X is Y? We manipulated: (i) whether an 
agentive entity (i.e., a person) was present in the scene (ENTITY: No Entity vs. Agent); (ii) 
whether the agent could  act or not act on the objects (ACTION POTENTIAL: Can Act vs. Cannot 
Act; and (iii) whether the agent’s orientation towards the scene was aligned with the speaker’s 
or not (ORIENTATION: Same vs Opposite).  
The study used an incomplete factorial design with NO ENTITY as control group and a 
2×2 within-subject within-item design for ENTITY Person with ACTION POTENTIAL: Can Act vs. 
Cannot Act) and ORIENTATION (Same vs. Opposite) as factors.  
4.1.4 Procedure 
The procedure was as in Experiment 1. 
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4.2 Data analysis 
4.2.1 Coding and exclusion criteria 
We excluded 35 participants (12%) who taken part in one of our previous experiments, 26 
participants (9%) for whom English was not their first language, and 4 participants (1.4%) 
who provided no responses. We further excluded 17 responses (0.25% of all observations) 
that contained explicit reference to both perspectives, 46 responses (0.67%) in which no 
perspective was taken (e.g., “the pear is at the opposite end of the table”), and 36 (0.52%) 
‘null’ responses, where the participant did not produce a response.  5215 observations from 
221 participants were included in the analysis (866 in Can act-Opposite, 873 in Cannot act-
Opposite, 873 in Can act-Same, 871 in Cannot act-Same, and 1732 in No Entity condition). 
4.3 Results 
Participants used a non-self perspective to describe the spatial location of the objects on 
10.2% of trials (see Table 7 and Figure 6). 105 participants (i.e., 48% of participants) never 
produced descriptions from a non-self perspective; in contrast, only 2 participants (i.e., 0.9% 
of participants) always produced descriptions from a non-self perspective. 
 
Table 7 
Frequency of self and non-self perspectives by LOCATION and 
ORIENTATION (N = 5215) in Experiment 3 
  Perspective Responses 
Orientation Action 
Potential 
self non-self 
Opposite Can act 741 125 
 Cannot act 772 101 
Same Can act 805 68 
 Cannot act 787 84 
No Entity  1577 155 
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Figure 6 Observed proportions of non-self descriptions in the five experimental conditions (Experiment 
3). Error bars represent non-parametrically bootstrapped (BCa) 95% confidence intervals on the 
participant-wise conditional means. 
 
A logit mixed model with ACTION POTENTIAL, ORIENTATION and their interaction as fixed 
effects (see Table 8) revealed a significant main effect of ORIENTATION: Participants were more 
likely to produce non-self descriptions when the agent held an opposite orientation to their 
own compared to when it had the same orientation (p < 0.01). There was a significant 
interaction between ACTION POTENTIAL and ORIENTATION (p  < 0.01), indicating that participants’ 
likelihood of using a non-self perspective when the agent could act on the objects was 
modulated by whether the agent’s orientation was the same as the participant’s orientation or 
not.  Simple effects analysis revealed a significant positive effect of ACTION POTENTIAL within 
the Opposite ORIENTATION conditions (β = 0.42, S.E. = .19, odds-ratio= 1.53, 95% CI [1.06; 2.21], 
p = 0.02), suggesting that when the agent’s perspective was the opposite to the participant’s 
perspective, participants were more likely to produce non-self descriptions when the agent 
could act on the objects than when it could not act on them. ACTION POTENTIAL had no 
significant effect within the Same ORIENTATION conditions (β = -0.35, S.E. = .21, odds-ratio= 
0.71, 95% CI [0.47; 1.06], p = 0.091), suggesting that when the agent’s perspective was the 
same as  the participant’s perspective, participants likelihood of producing non-self 
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descriptions was not affected by whether the agent could or could not act on the objects. 
 
Table 8 
Summary of the mixed logit model with Action Potential (Can Act = .5/ Cannot Act = -.5) and 
Orientation (Opposite = .5/ Same = -.5) as predictors for Experiment 3 (N=3483)1 
Predictors 
(fixed effects) 
Parameter estimates  Wald's test 
 Log-odds (β) S.E. Odds Ratio [95% CI] Z p(β = 0) 
Intercept -3.75 0.25 0.02  [0.01; 0.04] -15.12  
Orientation 0.61 0.21 1.84  [1.23; 2.77] 2.95 0.003 
Action Potential 0.02 0.14 1.02  [0.77; 1.35] 0.14 0.891 
Orientation:Action 
Potential 
0.77 0.28 2.15  [1.24; 3.72] 2.73 0.006 
Random effects Explained standard deviation estimates    
Subjects: (intercept) 2.28        
Subjects: Orientation 1.38        
Items: Orientation 0.27        
Items: Action Potential 0.09        
1 Because of singularity issues, random-effect terms estimated to -1/1 (if correlations) or to zero (if 
variance) were iteratively removed until this led to a non-singular fit of the model. All correlations 
between fixed effects r < |0.12|. 
 
 
4.4 Discussion 
Experiment 3 showed that speakers’ use of a non-self perspective was influenced by the 
presence in the scene of an agent with action potential, but only when that agent had an 
opposite orientation to their own. They were more likely to use a non-self description when 
the agent had an opposite orientation to their own, and could see and potentially act upon 
objects (but evinced no current action or intention to act) than when the agent had an 
opposite orientation to their own, and could not see and potentially act upon objects. 
However, they were as likely to use a non-self description when the agent had the same 
orientation as their own, and could see and potentially act upon objects, as when the agent 
had the same orientation as their own, and could not see and potentially act upon objects.  
These findings suggest that when speakers select a spatial perspective, they are drawn to the 
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perspective of an agent who can act but only when that agent has a different perspective to the 
speaker.  
5 General Discussion 
When people describe the location of objects, they must choose a perspective from which to 
do so, and our experiments show that this choice is affected by more than just communicative 
factors. Three experiments showed that speakers’ perspective was affected by the presence of 
another person in the scene, even though their utterances were not addressed to that person. 
Speakers were always more likely to adopt a self-perspective than a non-self perspective. 
However, they were more likely to adopt a non-self perspective when the scene included a 
person that had a different perspective to their own and that could see and act on the objects, 
compared to a scene that contained a person that could not see and act on the objects 
(Experiments 1 and 2). This tendency occurred even though the person was not actually 
acting on (or showing an intention to act on) the objects.  They were also more likely to adopt 
a non-self perspective when the scene included a person that had a different perspective to 
their own and that could see and act on the objects, compared to a scene that contained no 
other entity, if they had not been previously exposed to other experimental conditions (i.e., 
Block 1 of Experiment 2). Additionally, , speakers were more likely to adopt a non-self 
perspective when the scene included a person with a different perspective who could see the 
objects, but not a personwith the same perspective who could see the objects (Experiment 3).  
Participants were also more likely to adopt a non-self perspective when the scene 
contained a plant behind the table compared to when it contained a plant in front of the table, 
but they did so only when trials involving a plant were interspersed with trials involving a 
person (Experiment 1) and not otherwise (Experiment 2). We propose that speakers 
transferred intentionality and orientation from agents (humans) to non-agents (plants) in 
Experiment 1. Otherwise, speakers did not adopt a non-self perspective for a non-human 
entity.  To summarise, our results suggest that speakers were drawn to the perspective of an 
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agent who could act, and even when they were not addressing their spatial descriptions to 
that agent, but only if that agent had a different perspective to the speaker 
Our experiments therefore show the complex ways in which spatial perspective-taking 
can be affected by factors other than considerations of an addressee’s immediate 
communicative needs. We therefore propose that speakers make an initial decision about 
perspective, during the phase when they are ‘thinking for speaking’ – developing a 
conceptualization of what they want to describe. They can always adopt a self-perspective, but 
are sometimes drawn to a non-self perspective by the presence of an entity (another human) 
that is sufficiently similar to themselves.  
Our results demonstrate that this effect of another entity is crucially linked to the 
entity’s potential for agency, i.e., the fact that it is able to act on the relevant objects in the 
scene. Previous research has suggested that people’s conceptualization of spatial relations 
may be affected by the presence in a scene of entities with salient directional features, such as 
human agents (Santiesteban et al., 2014). But our studies show that the mere presence of such 
an entity does not in itself encourage speakers to adopt a non-self perspective when 
producing a spatial description: It is a necessary condition that the entity be able to act on 
relevant objects and offer an alternative perspective on the scene.  
Other studies have shown that the presence of an agent that is in an opposite 
orientation and that is acting or showing an intention to act on objects can encourage 
speakers to adopt a non-self perspective (e.g., Furlanetto et al., 2013; Tversky & Hard, 2009). 
Our studies show the agent does not need to be acting on, or showing any intention to act on, 
the objects to affect speakers’ choice of perspective: It simply needs to be able to act, as long as 
it has a different orientation to the speaker. 
One way to interpret our findings is in terms of simulation – speakers sometimes put 
themselves into the shoes of another agent and speak as though they were the agent.  On this 
account, our experiments identified some of the conditions under which speakers simulate, 
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specifically those in which the speaker’s choice of perspective is not a consequence of 
audience design reasons. We suggest that when speakers viewed the scene in preparation for 
producing a spatial description, they incorporated the agent’s location and orientation, and 
more specifically, the agent’s visual perspective (i.e., what they could and could not see), into 
their representation of the objects’ spatial arrangement.  Thus, when the agent was oriented 
in such a way that the objects were in the agent’s visual field, the speaker sometimes 
simulated the scene from the agent’s perspective. In other words, apprehending the visual 
perspective of another person made the speaker aware of a spatial perspective other than 
their own. As a result, when the agent’s perspective did not match participants’ (self) 
perspective, participants sometimes took a non-self perspective when generating a 
description of how the objects were located. When the agent’s perspective did match 
participants’ perspective, however, such simulation did not reinforce their use of a self-
perspective to generate a description. Our results suggest that the mechanisms underlying 
such simulation are linked to perceived agency but are independent of more explicit action-
related considerations (e.g., action understanding or discernible intentionality). 
Our findings are compatible with evidence from non-linguistic spatial cognition 
showing that another person's visual perspective can interfere with a participant’s 
performance on spatial (Zwickel & Mueller, 2010) and non-spatial (Samson, Apperly, 
Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010) target detection tasks, so long as that alternative 
perspective appears salient.  It is also congruent with previous findings that people can easily 
and quickly process what another person can or cannot see, without resorting to effortful 
mental representations (Kessler & Rutherford, 2010; Michelon & Zacks, 2006; Surtees, 
Apperly, & Samson, 2013). The participants in our experiments seemed to have relied on this 
ability and quickly processed whether the agent could or could not see the objects (see e.g., 
Gardner et al., 2013, for evidence of how such processing might occur without simulation); 
this information then affected whether they simulated the agent's spatial perspective in the 
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scene as they produced their utterance. This is important, as determining what an agent can 
or cannot see before simulating their position in space can prevent us from unnecessary  
simulation (cf. Johnson & Demiris, 2005). 
We cannot be sure how consistently the characteristics of the agent triggered 
participants to simulate its perspective when preparing their utterances. Note that people find 
it more effortful to make verbal left/right judgments that involve a non-self perspective than 
equivalent motor responses (Kessler & Thomson, 2010), most likely as a consequence of the 
ambiguity of left and right (Coventry & Garrod, 2004).  Hence speakers may be less likely 
overall to simulate another agent’s perspective in linguistic tasks than in non-linguistic tasks, 
and this may be exacerbated in contexts where there is no incentive to do so (as in our study). 
It is also possible that what an agent can see may not always be a sufficiently strong cue to the 
agent’s relevance and perspective to trigger a non-self perspective in the speaker. Our results – 
in particular the fact that many participants only ever used a self-perspective – are also 
consistent with the existence of individual differences in spatial perspective-taking that can 
affect use of spatial language (Schober, 2009), though our experiments were not designed to 
investigate this question directly. 
Nor can we be sure whether participants considered only one perspective when 
‘thinking for speaking’, or whether they considered more than one perspective in parallel.  On 
the serial account, the speaker may have initially adopted one perspective (we assume the 
self-perspective) when generating a description, and then sometimes been triggered to 
abandon it by the presence of the agent.  On the parallel account, the two perspectives 
competed for selection, and the presence of the agent (with particular characteristics) 
supported the non-self perspective).  Many studies have demonstrated parallel processing of 
alternatives at different levels of language production, including conceptualisation (see 
Melinger, Branigan, & Pickering, 2014), but our data are compatible with serial or parallel 
processing.  
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Our results show clearly, however, that the self perspective was most frequently 
selected as the basis for sentence formulation.  The presence of an agent with action potential 
only sometimes induced speakers to produce non-self descriptions. Overall, the pattern of 
effects is consistent with other research on language production, which similarly finds that a 
range of factors such as visual salience and ease of processing affect speakers’ choices in a 
probabilistic rather than deterministic way (Bock, 1986; Goudbeek & Krahmer, 2012). 
Our experiments did not find evidence for agency-independent object-centred spatial 
coding, in which participants used the additional entity as a source of spatial coordinates (e.g., 
their intrinsic left/right axes) without simulating the alternative perspective (Heyes, 2014). 
But of course such mapping mechanisms using intrinsic axes might be relevant in other 
contexts, in particular where the relevant scenes include only the located object and the 
person (e.g., Mazzarella et al., 2012). This type of scene may induce participants to use the 
only other available entity (i.e., the person) as a source of spatial encoding for the located 
object, especially when the person’s pose (e.g., head turned, arm stretched) created 
asymmetries that made their left/right axes more salient. Such an explanation could explain 
why previous studies using this paradigm found that, unlike a picture including a person in a 
neutral pose, a picture including a person engaged in action triggered more non-self 
descriptions than a baseline picture that did not include a person (e.g., Mazzarella et al., 
2012). Hence it is possible that simulation mechanisms and intrinsic-axes mapping 
mechanisms may have additive effects, so that the adoption of a non-self perspective has both 
perceived intentional and non-intentional components. The non-intentional component might 
also encompass other potentially relevant considerations such as the intrinsic features or 
functional affordances of the located objects (e.g., Carlson-Radvansky & Radvansky, 1997; 
Johannsen & De Ruiter, 2013). 
Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that spatial perspective taking 
during language production is linked to speakers processing others’ representations of a 
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shared environment, and in particular what information those others are likely to be aware or 
unaware of. This conclusion is strengthened by previous findings that individuals tend to 
ignore stimuli that another person ignores (e.g., Frischen, Loach, & Tipper, 2009). It is also in 
line with evidence that knowing that another person is looking at the same stimuli affects how 
people encode spatial information to solve a target detection/inhibition task (Boekler, 
Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2011; Boekler & Zwickel, 2013). In our experiments, a more basic form of 
“shared attention” may be implicated. The person in our photographed scenes never directed 
their gaze at the objects, but appeared to experience the same scene as the participant (even if 
from a different perspective, and presumably at a different point in time). Speakers may have 
been sensitive to this “shared attention” when generating their spatial descriptions. An 
important question for future research is whether any such effects of shared attention depend 
on another person being represented as physically present in the observed environment or 
might also be induced by the mere belief that someone else is attending to the same 
environment at the same time. 
In conclusion, our results demonstrate that speakers’ choice of spatial perspective 
can be influenced simply by perceiving another agent with the potential to act, even when they 
are not addressing that agent. When we produce spatial descriptions, we sometimes 
spontaneously simulate another agent’s perspective: We ‘talk in another person’s shoes’.   
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Notes 
 
i We use ‘speaker’ throughout to refer to someone producing language, whether in the spoken 
or written modality. 
 
iiThe distinction between a self- and a non-self perspective (i.e., a self vs. non-self origin of the 
coordinate system) is independent of the distinction between different types of reference frame, 
such as Levinson’s (2003) contrast between a relative reference frame, based on the viewpoint 
of a perceiver, and an intrinsic reference frame, based on the directional features of another 
entity in the environment. Crucially for our study, both relative and intrinsic reference frames 
are compatible with a self-perspective and with a non-self perspective. I can describe the same 
object as The ball to the left of the vase with respect to my own viewpoint (self relative) or 
another person’s viewpoint (non-self relative), or as The ball to the left with respect to my own 
axes (self intrinsic), or another person’s axes (non-self intrinsic).   
 
                                                 
